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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintif^Appellant,
v.

:

Case No. 20040491-CA

:

WAYNE A. MOWER,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The State appeals from the trial court's order granting defendant's motion to
dismiss the charge of issuing a bad check, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-505(2) (2003) (R. 1) (statute attached in Addendum A). This Court has
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erroneously determined that
defendant could not be held criminally liable where he not only issued an insufficientfunds check to an individual with the purpose of obtaining something of value for it, but
he in fact received a secondary expected value when he failed to make good on the check
to the credit union who had cashed it for the individual.

Because "a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss is a question of law[,]" it is
reviewed for correctness, with no particular deference to its legal conclusions. State v.
Taylor, 884 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903,
905 (Utah 1982)); see also State v. Spainhower, 988 P.2d 452, 453 (Utah App. 1999).
This Court also reviews questions of statutory interpretation for correctness. State
v. McKinnon, 2002 UT App 214, If 3, 51 P.3d 729; see also State v. Martinez, 2002 UT
80, H 5, 52P.3dl276.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES
Only Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (2003), is relevant to the issue on appeal (in
Add. A).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with one count of issuing a bad check (R.
1). Defendant failed to appear at several hearings, then retained counsel and waived his
preliminary hearing (R. 10, 14, 22-23, 29, 38-40). Defense counsel filed a motion to
dismiss and supporting memorandum, arguing that, pursuant to State v. Green, 672 P.2d
400 (Utah 1983), defendant could not be criminally liable for issuing a bad check because
defendant "did not issue the check for the purpose of receiving any money [,]" he in fact
"received nothing" in return for the check, and, therefore, there was a failure of proof on
the essential elements of issuing a check "for the purpose of obtaining . . . [a] thing of
value[.]" (R. 41-46). The State filed an opposing memorandum, and argument followed
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(R. 50-54; R. 70: passim). The trial judge thereafter dismissed the charge, finding that
defendant possessed no criminal intent, his failure to take action to protect the credit
union did not constitute criminal conduct under the statute, and the statute provided for no
criminal liability where defendant "did not obtain or intend to obtain something of value
with a bad check" (R. 50, 56-57; R. 70: 31-33) (ruling attached in Addendum B).
The parties were unable to agree on findings of fact and conclusions of law (R.
55). Consequently, the trial judge drafted his own (R. 58-61) (attached in Addendum B).
The State timely appealed the ruling (R. 62-63).
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
Defendant operates "A-Quick Loan," a business in which customers "place the
title to automobiles as security for short term loans" (R. 58; R. 70:7). On June 12, 2002,
the defendant and Nick Kirkman entered into an agreement whereby defendant would
loan Kirkman $4,900.00, and, in return, Kirkman would repay the loan and, later the same
day, deliver a title to one of Kirkman's vehicles as security for the loan (R. 58-59; R.
70:7). Defendant gave Kirkman the check as agreed (R. 59; R. 70: 7). Although the two
men had done business in the past, defendant made sure that the account on which the

because defendant waived his preliminary hearing, the State takes its facts as
stated by the parties to the district court in their argument on the motion to dismiss, and
from the district court's Findings of Fact (R. 58-59; R. 70: 1-30). Defendant has not been
tried and so retains the presumption of innocence.
3

check was written would have insufficient funds to cover the check until after Kirkman
had delivered the title as promised (R. 59; R. 70: 7-10).
Kirkman never delivered the vehicle title to defendant (R. 59; R. 70:8). However,
he deposited the check into his account at Weber State Credit Union ["credit union5'] (R.
59). He then proceeded to write checks against the deposit until the entire sum was
depleted (R. 59; R. 70:7). The credit union covered the checks (R. 70:10).
The credit union presented the check to defendant's bank, which would not honor
the check due to insufficient funds in the account (R. 59; R. 70: 9). Glen Sederholm, the
vice president of the credit union, sent defendant a fourteen-day demand letter via
certified mail, seeking payment for the dishonored check (R. 59). Defendant accepted the
notice, but failed to make good on the check (id).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erroneously granted defendant's motion to dismiss based on a
misreading of the plain language of the charging statute. The district court's findings of
fact contain two relevant misinterpretations: 1) the statute requires the State to prove that
defendant received something of value in exchange for the check; and 2) the statute does
not place on defendant any obligation to cover the check.
To the contrary, the language of subparagraph (2) of the bad check statute under
which defendant was charged provides that the check be issued "for the purpose of
obtaining" something of value and that the accused is guilty "if he fails to make good and
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actual payment.. . within 14 days" of receiving notice that the check was rejected by the
drawee:
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment
of money ,for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership,
or corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for
any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft
is legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if
he fails to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the
refused check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the
check or draft's nonpayment.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(2) (2003) (emphasis added). Add. A. The plain language of
this statute establishes that the trial court's factual findings are clearly erroneous.
The trial court's conclusions of law elaborate on those misstated facts, faulting the
State for failing to establish that defendant "obtained something of value" in return for his
check; that defendant "possessed any criminal intent" where he did not cause a loss to the
credit union; and that defendant committed a criminal act "contemplated by the statute as
charged" where he failed to take any action to protect the credit union. The dismissal of
the charge against defendant cannot be based on these conclusions because the plain
language of the statute does not require the State to establish any of these points.
Finally, the district court incorrectly applied the analysis in State v. Green, 672
P.2d 400 (1990), to this case where, not only are the facts and circumstances readily
distinguishable, but the charge in Green was based on the bad check statute before
subsection (2) was added, and the elements of the offense detailed in subsection (2) are
not the same as those in the statute giving rise to Green.
5

ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT MISINTERPRETED THE PLAIN
LANGUAGE OF THE CHARGING STATUTE; UNDER THE
APPROPRIATE INTERPRETATION, DISMISSAL IS
INAPPROPRIATE
The trial court erroneously determined that dismissal was appropriate because the
State had not established defendant's criminal liability under Utah Code Annotated,§ 766-505(2) (R. 58-61; R. 70: 31-33). Add. B. The trial court based its decision on the
absence of proof that: 1) defendant "in fact" received anything of value in this
transaction; 2) defendant did more than "innocently" write a check or that he harbored
any " intent to defraud anyone" in this case; and 3) defendant "caus[ed ] the loss" to the
credit union (id). In making these determinations, the trial court overlooked the plain
and unambiguous language of the statute and relevant case law.
A,

The Trial Court's Ruling
After hearing argument from the parties, the district court determined that the

matter was controlled by State v. Green, 672 P.2d 400 (Utah 1983) (R. 60; R. 70:31-33)
(in Addendum C). The court began by noting that, although other courts had
distinguished Green, it could not do so (R. 70:31). Add. B.
But, frankly, I do not see that it makes a difference. The purpose of
obtaining — he issued the check with the purpose of obtaining something
of value. The argument of the State is that he intended to get a title and
repayment of a loan.
But, frankly, that gets into the civil aspect of this case. And he did
not, in fact, receive anything of value in this transaction. And I do not
6

believe that the statute should criminalize the conduct that occurred here
against the person that actually issued the check because, in fact, civil
remedies do exist for that. And to make it a crime for someone to
innocently write a check and then be defrauded by the recipient of that
check, and then that person deposits the check after committing the fraud
and draws the money out of it, I do not think distinguishes it sufficiently
from Green to say that the holding in Green should not apply.
Now, the sad thing about this is Weber State Credit Union does
suffer. But as far as charging Mr. Mower, who had no criminal intent in
this case, to charge him with a crime I think is beyond the scope of the
statute.
And he quite clearly could be civilly liable for this, even though it
wasn't his intent to defraud anyone. He did put his check in the commercial
stream. And it's very much like a husband and a wife getting divorced at
that point then if they had debts that were civil in nature, then they both end
up being civilly responsible for those debts.
But as far as criminally culpable, I can not see that the statute is
intended, in light of Green, to include Mr. Mower as one of those who
should be criminally liable, therefore.
(R. 70:31-33). Add. B.
When the parties thereafter were unable to agree on specific findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the district court judge entered his own, which provided in relevant
part:
FINDINGS OF FACT

9. Mower gave the check for $4,900.00 to Kirkman who defrauded
him by failing to deliver title to a vehicle as security for repayment and
therefore, Mower did not receive anything of value in exchange for the
check.
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10. The Court finds that Mower had no obligation under the
criminal law to cover the $4,900.00 check issued herein.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

2. The Court finds that the promise to deliver title by Kirkman who
then defrauded Mower is not sufficient to satisfy the statutory provision of
UCA § 76-6-505(2) of the State's claim that Mower obtained something of
value in return for payment of the $4,900.00.
3. The Court cannot find Mower possessed any criminal intent in
this matter as Kirkman engaged in deception of Mower and then obtained
the financial benefit of the deception, thereby causing the loss to his own
credit union.
4. Even though Weber State Credit Union accepted Mower's check
in good faith and suffered a loss by paying out from Kirkman's account, it
was Kirkman's deception to Mower and subsequent deposit of the
fraudulently obtained check in his account that caused . . . the loss to Weber
State Credit Union. The Court recognizes that Mower could possibly have
stopped payment on the check or taken other action to protect the credit
union, but his failure to do so does not constitute a criminal act
contemplated by the statute as charged.
5. The Court believes its findings are consistent with the intent of
the case of State v. Green, 672 P.2d 400 (1990), even though the facts in
Green and this case are distinguishable.
6. Mower should not be criminally liable under UCA § 76-6-505(2)
as he did not obtain or intend to obtain something of value with a bad
check.
(R. 59-60). Add. B. The State contends that each of these statements results from a
misreading of the statute and fails to support the dismissal of the charge.
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B.

Relevant Statutory Provisions and Applicable Law
Defendant was charged under subsection (2) of Utah's bad check statute, which

provides that a person who issues a check for the purpose of obtaining something of value
is guilty of issuing a bad check if he does not make payment on the check within fourteen
days of receiving actual notice that the drawee refused payment:
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment
of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership,
or corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for
any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft
is legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if
he fails to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the
refused check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the
check or draft's nonpayment.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(2) (2003). Add. A.
State v. Green, referred to by the district court, was decided before a 1983
amendment to the statute divided the offense of issuing a bad check into two types of
conduct. The pre-1983 statute discussed in Green provided that a person was guilty of
issuing a bad check if he issued a check for the purpose of obtaining something of value,
knowing at the time that the check will not be paid by the drawee, and the drawee in fact
refuses payment on the check:
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check for the payment of
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the
drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad
check.

9

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1978) (in Addendum A).
The State's challenge primarily involves the district court's interpretation of the
statute. When faced with an issue of statutory interpretation, "[an appellate court's]
primary obligation is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain
language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." State v. Burns, 2000
UT 56, Tf 25, 4 P.3d 795. Accordingly, an appellate court presumes that the legislature
used each term of a statute advisedly, and only looks beyond the plain language if it is
ambiguous. State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, \ 22, 989 P.2d 1091; see also Burns,
2000 UT 56, \ 25. The court "avoid[s] interpretations that will render portions of a
statute superfluous or inoperative." State v. McKinnon, 2002 UT App 214, ^ 6, n.4, 51
P.3d 729 (quoting State v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, ^ 10, 44 P.3d 680 (citations
omitted)).
C.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Underlying the District Court's
Decision Do Not Support the Court's Ruling
The district court judge based his decision on his determination that: 1) defendant

did not, "in fact," receive anything of value in this transaction; 2) defendant "innocently"
wrote a check while harboring no "intent to defraud anyone" in this case; and 3)
defendant did not "caus[e ] the loss" to the credit union (R. 58-61; R. 70: 31-33). Add. B.
None of these findings supports the dismissal of the charge in this case.
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1. The current statute does not require that defendant receive something of
value
The district court's finding of fact number 9 is irrelevant to his guilt under
subsection 2:
Mower gave the check for $4,900.00 to Kirkman who defrauded him
by failing to deliver title to a vehicle as security for repayment and
therefore, Mower did not receive anything of value in exchange for the
check.

(R. 59; Finding of Fact #9) (emphasis added). Add. B. The court's conclusions of law
number 2 and 6 are improper statements of the elements of subsection 2:
The Court finds that the promise to deliver title by Kirkman who then
defrauded Mower is not sufficient to satisfy the statutory provision of UCA
§ 76-6-505(2) of the State's claim that Mower obtained something of value
in return for payment of the $4,900.00.

Mower should not be criminally liable under UCA § 76-6-505(2) as
he did not obtain or intend to obtain something of value with a bad check.
(R. 60; Conclusions of Law ## 2, 6) (emphasis added). Add. B.
The statute under which defendant was charged requires that the State establish the
following elements: (1) that defendant issued or passed a check (2) "for the purpose of
obtaining" something of value, (3) payment of which was legally refused by the drawee,
and (4) defendant received actual notice of the draft's nonpayment, but (5) failed to pay
the draft within the following fourteen days. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(2) (2003);
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see also State v. Bartholomew, 724 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 1986) (interpreting subsection (1)
of the statute, holding that if defendant "issued a bad check knowing that it would not be
paid by the drawee at presentment and that defendant issued the checker the purpose of
obtaining something ofvalue[,]" he's guilty) (original emphasis omitted; emphasis
added). Nothing in the statute requires that the State prove that defendant in fact obtained
something in exchange for the bad check, as required by the lower court.2
The plain language of the entire statute reveals that the clear legislative purpose of
the statute is to protect the integrity of checks by preventing the negotiation and delivery
of worthless instruments into commerce. See State v. Berry, 358 So.2d 545, 545 (Fla.
1978) (purpose of bad check statute is to "ban[] the circulation of worthless commercial
paper because of the danger it poses to the flow of trade[.]"). To that end, the plain
language of subsection (2) as it relates to this case requires that the check be issued "for
the purpose of obtaining" a "thing of value[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(2) (emphasis
added). "Purpose" is defined as "An objective, goal, or end" (Black's Law Dictionary,
Eighth Ed. 2004); "something that one sets before himself as an object to be attained: an

Notwithstanding that the State need not prove the receipt of something of value in
order to obtain a conviction under subsection (2), that parties agree that the parties
entered into a loan arrangement, implying that defendant received Kirkman's promise to
repay the loan (R. 58-59; R. 70:7-8). Defendant simply failed to get security. Defendant
also received the intervention of a third party "guarantor" of Kirkman's performance
which enabled him to put a facially-negotiable check into commerce without risking his
own finances. Plus, defendant received Kirkman's promise to repay the loan, from which
has arisen a right of action against Kirkman.
12

end or aim to be kept in view, in any plan, measure, exertion, or operation[.]" Webster's
Third New International Dictionary, p. 1847, copyright 1993.
The trial court read the statute as requiring that defendant actually "obtain"
something of value, thereby rendering superfluous the legislature's inclusion of the
broader phrase "for the purpose off.]" As the language in the statute is plain and
unambiguous, and each term therein is presumed to have been used "advisedly and .. .
according to its ordinary meaning[,]" the district court's interpretation is incorrect. See
McKinnon, 2002 UT App 214, \ 6, n.4 (quoting Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, \ 10
(citations omitted)). Accordingly, the trial court's finding # 9 and conclusion #2 that the
State did not establish that defendant "obtained something of value in return for payment
of the $4,900.00" are incorrect, and do not support dismissal of the case. See
Bartholomew, 724 P.2d at 354.
Additionally, the lower court's conclusion #6 that defendant "should not be
criminally liable under UCA § 76-6-505(2) as he did not.. . intend to obtain something
of value" runs contrary to the evidence. A review of the arguments and the facts agreed
to below shows that defendant issued the check "for the purpose o f obtaining both the
title to one of Kirkman's vehicles and his loan obligation (R. 58-59; R. 70: 7-8). There is
no dispute that defendant intended for Kirkman to obtain $4,900.00 from defendant's
account only after Kirkman had delivered the vehicle title to defendant (id).
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Accordingly, the dismissal cannot be properly based on the State's failure to establish
what the plain language of the statute does not require.
2. Kirkman's conduct does not negate defendant's criminal liability or his
criminal intent under subsection (2)
The district court's finding of fact number 10 misstates the plain language of
subsection (2):
The Court finds that Mower had no obligation under the criminal
law to cover the $4,900.00 check issued herein.
(R. 59; Finding of Fact #10) (emphasis added). Add. B. Further, the court's conclusions
of law number 3 and 4 are incorrect statements of the requirements of subsection (2):
The Court cannot find Mower possessed any criminal intent in this
matter as Kirbnan engaged in deception of Mower and then obtained the
financial benefit of the deception, thereby causing the loss to his own credit
union.
Even though Weber State Credit Union accepted Mower's check in
good faith and suffered a loss by paying out from Kirbnan's account, it was
Kirkman 's deception to Mower and subsequent deposit of the fraudulently
obtained check in his account that caused. . . the loss to Weber State Credit
Union. The Court recognizes that Mower could possibly have stopped
payment on the check or taken other action to protect the credit union, but
his failure to do so does not constitute a criminal act contemplated by the
statute as charged.
(R. 60; Conclusions of Law ## 3-4) (emphasis added). Add. B.
These findings and conclusions demonstrate the district court's focus on Kirkman
and his degree of culpability in defrauding the credit union. However, the statute does
not distinguish between degrees of culpability or the identity of the one presenting the
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check for payment and receiving its proceeds. These findings and conclusions cannot
stand in the face of the plain language of subsection (2) of the bad check statute.
Intent to defraud is not an element of the offense of writing bad checks under
either subparagraph of the statute. See State v. Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314, 1315 (1983)
(noting that it was purposefully removed by the legislature in the 1977 revision of the
statute); see also State v. Coando, 784 P.2d 1228, 1231 n.4 (Utah App. 1989), affd 858
P.2d 926 (Utah 1992). Further, only subsection (1) expressly requires knowledge on the
part of the check issuer that the drawee will legally refuse to pay the check, which
knowledge is satisfied by evidence that the issuer knew that the account on which the
check was written had been depleted to the point the check would not be honored. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1); see Bartholomew, 724 P.2d at 354; Delmotte, 665 P.2d at
1315 (addressing the pre-1983 version of the statute, holding that "4[k]nowledge' of the
account's depletion is a material element of the offense charged").
Defendant herein was charged under subsection (2), which targets similar, but not
identical, situations as those encompassed by subsection (1). See Bartholomew, 724 P.2d
at 354 ("subparagraph (2) of § 76-6-505 makes criminal the issuance of bad checks in
certain circumstances which subparagraph (1) does not reach."). Subsection (2) contains
no knowledge requirement, but instead encompasses the situation where "a person writes
a bad check and does not know that there are insufficient funds in his account, or
negligently or in good faith believes that it will be paid and it is not[.]" Id. In such a
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situation, the person is not guilty of issuing a bad check "unless he fails to make good on
the check within fourteen days after actual notice of nonpayment by the drawee." Id.
(emphasis added); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(2). In other words, under
subsection (2), it is not the existence of any criminal intent in the issuance of the check
but the fact that the issuer did not make good on the check as provided in the statute that
determines defendant's liability for issuing the bad check. Consequently, the district
court's finding that defendant "had no obligation under the criminal law to cover the . . .
check[,]" and its conclusions that defendant possessed no "criminal intent" and that he is
not criminally liable for failing to take action "to protect the credit union" run contrary to
the plain language of subsection (2) and do not support dismissal of the charge against
defendant.
Defendant is not being prosecuted because he knew at the outset that his check
would not be honored by his bank, or because he knew by the end of the day when he did
not receive the title that the check would be rejected, or because he learned that Kirkman
had cashed the check at the credit union, or because he took no action to protect the credit
union. He is being prosecuted because, after receiving actual notice that the credit union
cashed the facially-negotiable but worthless check he put into commerce, he did not pay
the credit union the face amount of the check, as required by the statute. Neither party
contested this fact below. Defendant knew, upon receipt of the demand from the credit
union, that the check had been cashed and honored, and defendant's bank had refused to
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pay it. With that knowledge, defendant represented that he would make good on the
check, then failed to do so. This undisputed conduct brings defendant within the scope
of subsection (2).
3. The decision in State v. Green has no application to this case
The district court's conclusion of law number 5 cannot stand upon a review of the
analysis m State v. Green:
The Court believes its findings are consistent with the intent of the
case o/State v. Green, 672 P.2d 400 (1990), even though the facts in Green
and this case are distinguishable,
(R. 59; Conclusion of Law #5). Add. B.
Instead of reviewing the plain language of the statute, the trial judge looked to the
case of State v. Green, 672 P.2d 400 (1990), finding that, despite distinguishable factors,
the cases were sufficiently similar to make Green controlling in this matter (R. 60; R. 70:
31-33).
Green involved a review by the Utah Supreme Court of a conviction for an
insufficient funds charge under the pre-1983 version of the statute that did not contain
two separate subdivisions. Mr. and Mrs. Green went to a bank, opened a certificate of
deposit in their own names, and wrote a check from another of their own accounts in
another bank to cover the cost of the certificate. 672 P.2d at 400. Add. C. The next day,
the couple changed their minds about the transaction and returned to the bank to cancel
the certificate and get a refund. Id. Add. C. Although the bank had not yet cashed the
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check, it refused to cancel the certificate without the Greens paying an early withdrawal
penalty. Id. Add. C. The Greens refused. Id. Add. C. Subsequently, the bank
processed the check, only to discover that the Greens had closed their bank account the
same day they changed their mind on the certificate of deposit, and that the account had
contained insufficient funds to cover the cost of the certificate of deposit. Id. Add. C.
Therefore, the bank reported the insufficient funds check to the local police department,
and Mr. Green was arrested and convicted. Id. Add. C.
A majority of the Utah Supreme Court reversed the conviction. Id. at 401. Add.
C. The majority of the Court found that the language of the statute at that time—now
found in subsection (1)— required that defendant write the check for the purpose of
obtaining from the bank "any money, property or other thing of value belonging to" the
bank. Id. Add. C. The Court found that the State had failed to prove this element
because, while defendant used his own money to open what amounted to a savings
account and received a receipt (money market certificate of deposit) for his own funds,
that receipt had no value until the check cleared the bank and the money was actually
deposited in the bank, which never occurred. Id. Add. C. With no deposit occurring, the
bank "did not part with anything of value which it owned" when it issued the
certificate/receipt. Id. Add. C. Consequently, the Court said, defendant did not issue his
check for the purpose of obtaining anything of value from the bank, defeating an essential
element of the crime. Id. Add. C.
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The district court in this case recognized that there were distinguishable facts
between this case and Green, but found the "intent" behind the decision in Green to be
controlling (R. 60). Add. B. Green involved numerous factors that differed from this
case which, together, render the analysis in Green inapplicable to this case. The main
difference is the involvement in this matter of subsection (2) of the statute, criminalizing
the unknowing issuance of a bad check where defendant fails to make good on the check
within 14 days of receiving notice that the check was dishonored. This is in contrast to
the statute in Green which required knowledge that the check would not be honored.
Subsection (2) was not yet drafted when Green was charged and convicted, but it is the
sole basis of the charge in this matter (R. 1).
While Green was decided on the basis of language which appears in both
subsections under the current statute—"for the purpose of obtaining .. . [something of
value"—the analysis in Green is inapplicable to this prosecution under subsection (2).
See Green, 672 P.2d at 401. Add. C. In Green, the Supreme Court pointed out
The undisputed evidence is that the defendant did not write the check
for the purpose of obtaining from United [the bank] any money, property or
other thing of value belonging to United. It was not intended by either
United or the defendant that United would give him anything for his check.
It was their intention that the defendant open a savings account in his own
name with his own money.

Representatives of United Savings testified that the certificate issued
to the defendant was not negotiable and could not be redeemed, cashed or
borrowed against until the check creating the deposit had cleared the bank
19

upon which it was drawn and defendant's funds were in United's
possession, which normally took seven days. Thus United did not part with
anything of value which it owned when it issued the certificate.

There is no claim made by the State that the defendant attempted to
make any use of the certificate. United did not incur any liability on the
certificate, including any liability to pay interest thereon. Because of its
policy of waiting until the depositor's check cleared before honoring the
certificate, United was never at any risk. . . .
Green, 672 P.2d at 401 (emphasis added). The focus of this explanation is on the fact
that "[i]t was not intended by either United or the defendant that United would give him
anything for his check." Id. The remainder of the analysis merely demonstrates that in
fact nothing was given for the check, thereby supporting the Court's statement that
nothing was intended to be given.
The same cannot be said about the case at bar. The undisputed evidence here is
that defendant, in the course of his business and pursuant to a year-long business
relationship with Kirkman, wrote his check for the purpose of obtaining from Kirkman
his immediate promise to repay the loan—presumably with interest— and the promise to
deliver the title to one of his vehicles to be held as security pending repayment of the loan
(R. 58-59; R. 70: 7). Add. B. Hence, unlike in Green, it was not only intended by
defendant, if not Kirkman, at the time defendant tendered the check that defendant would
receive something of value for the check, but he in fact got a promise from defendant to
repay the loan. In addition:
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-defendant admits to having intentionally lowered the balance in the account on
which the check was written so that the check would not clear the account in the
event Kirkman did not deliver the promised title (R. 70: 7-10);
-defendant failed to pay the credit union when he received notice that his
bank had refused to honor the check (R. 59);
-the check was facially negotiable throughout the duration of the
transaction at issue, appearing to have value to any who accepted it in the
course of commerce (R. 59; R. 70: 7-8); and
-defendant in fact received a "thing of value" by shifting what should have
been his own loss to a third party, leaving his own finances in tact.
Consequently, unlike the defendant's use of his own money in the Green
transaction, defendant's actions here insured that his own money would not be at risk
should Kirkman fail to perform as agreed. Defendant's conduct predictably ensured that
some third party who honored the check then attempted to collect from defendant's
account would, in essence, become the guarantor of Kirkman's performance: if Kirkman
never produced the vehicle title, the guarantor would never collect from defendant on the
check. Given the nature of defendant's business and the suggestion that he had done this
before, any reasonable person would know that, when he issued the check and made sure
that it was written on an account containing insufficient funds, the outcome faced by the
credit union was possible. Once notified of his bank's failure to pay the credit union,
defendant undeniably knew what had occurred and still failed to make good on the check.
Hence, he not only issued the check "for the purpose" of obtaining the title to Kirkman's
vehicle and, hence, a profitable business loan, but, he arguably knew that, should that
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anticipated "thing of value" not materialize, he would ensure that someone besides
himself shouldered the burden of loss should Kirkman cash the check anyway or go
through a third party.
The credit union parted with value when it gave its money to Kirkman in exchange
for the check, expecting that defendant's bank would honor the check on presentment.
Further, despite the fact that it was Kirkman who tendered the check to the credit union, it
was defendant's issuance of the insufficient-funds check, together with his failure to
make good on the check, that caused the credit union to ultimately suffer the loss.
Accordingly, none of the points identified in Green as establishing that the case
was "nothing more than the defendant writing himself a worthless check" exist in this
case: defendant wrote the check for the purpose of obtaining a thing of value, he intended
to obtain benefit for the check, the check had value upon its issuance, the check placed
third parties at risk where it was negotiable but was based on an account containing
insufficient funds to cover it, the credit union parted with something of value when it
cashed the check, and defendant failed two opportunities to remedy the credit union's
loss. Because the missing element in Green was present in this case, the district court's
decision to dismiss the case was incorrect, and the matter should have been permitted to
go forward.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
trial court's order dismissing the felony charge against defendant and remand the matter
for further proceedings.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED
The State requests that this matter be set for oral argument and that a published
opinion issue. This case presents an important issue regarding protection of the integrity
of commercial paper. The district courts appear to require guidance in their interpretation
of the relevant statute to insure uniformity in their treatment of these cases.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /

^day of November, 2004.
MARK SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

[S C. LEON.
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant were hand-deliverec^mailed by first-cla^s mail, postage-prepaid, to John T.
Caine, Richards, Caine & Allen, P.C., attorneys for defendant/appellee, 2568 Washington
Blvd., Ogden, Utah 84401, this /

/ d a y of November, 2004.
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Addendum A

76-6-505. Issuing a bad check or draft — Presumption.
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for t h e payment of
money, for t h e purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by t h e drawee
and payment is refused by t h e drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft.
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a check or draft for
which payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check or
draft would not be paid if h e h a d no account with the drawee at the time of
issue.
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for t h e payment of
money, for t h e purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft is
legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if he fails
to make good a n d actual payment to the payee in the amount of t h e refused
check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the check or
draft's nonpayment.
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be punished as follows:
(a) If t h e check or draft or series of checks or drafts made or drawn in
this state within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum of
not more t h a n $200, such offense shall be a class B misdemeanor.
(b) If t h e check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding
$200 but not more t h a n $300, such offense shall be a class A misdemeanor.
(c) If t h e check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding
$300 b u t not more t h a n $1,000, such offense shall be a felony of t h e third
degree.
(d) If t h e check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding
$1,000, such offense shall be a second degree felony.

(2003)

76-6-505. Issuing a bad check—Presumption.—(1) Any person who
issues or passes a check for the payment of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any money,
property, or other thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary,
labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the drawee and payment is
refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check.
(2) For purposes of this section, a person who issues a check for which
payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check would
not be paid if he had no account with the drawee at the time of issue.
(3)

An offense of issuing a bad check shall be punished as follows:

(a) If the check or series of checks made or drawn in this state within
a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum of not more than $100,
such offense shall be a class B misdemeanor.
(b) If the check or checks drawn in this state within a period not
exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding $100 but not more than
$250, such offense shall be a class A misdemeanor.
(c) If the check or checks made or drawn in this state within a period
not exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding $250 but not more
than $1,000, such offense shall be a felony of the third degree.
(d) If the check or checks made or drawn in this state within a period
not exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding $1,000, such offense
shall be a second degree felony.

(1978)

Addendum B

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT, ^
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW R& DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMJSS

vs.
WAYNE A. MOWER,

Case No. 031900711 FS %
• Honorable Roger S. Dutson "^

' \
'•*

Defendant.

MAY % 1 ?fW4
On the 30th day of January, 2004 a hearing was held before the Honorable Judge Roger S.
Dutson regarding Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Present was Brenda J. Beaton, Deputy Weber
County Attorney representing the State; John T. Caine, representing defendant, Wayne A. Mower;
and Wayne A. Mower, defendant.
The parties argued the matter and submitted the matter to the Court for decision. The Court
having reviewed all the pleadings and having considered argument of the parties, and being fully
advised in the premises, now makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this
matter and Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Mower operates A-Quick Loan business and had done business loaning money to Kirkman
in return for automobile titles as security for repayment during the year prior to this incident.
2. On or about June 12, 2002, defendant, Wayne A. Mower, (Mower) who operates a title
loan business in which persons place the title to automobiles as security for short term loans, was
approached by one Nick Kirkman (Kirkman) for a loan of $4,900 00 secured by an automobile title.
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3. Mower informed Kirkman that he would loan the $4,900.00 based upon previous business
dealings of the parties in which Mower prepared a check for Kirkman and then Kirkman immediately
delivered the title to Mower.
4. Mower gave Kirkman a check for $4,900.00 and Kirkman defrauded Mower by never
bringing him the title to the vehicle.
5. Kirkman deposited the check into his own bank account at the Weber State Credit Union
and they paid out money relying on the validity of the check.
6. Mower refused to honor the check fraudulently obtained by Kirkman and used for
Kirkman's benefit.
7. Weber State Credit Union sent a notice to Mower to make good on the check within 14
days and he refused to do so.
8. The State filed third degree felony criminal charges against Mower pursuant to UCA §766-505(2) which statute reads:
"Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of any money, for
the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any
money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary,
labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft is legally refused by the drawee, is
guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if he fails to make good and actual payment to
the payee in the amount of the refused check, or draft within 14 days of his receiving
actual notice of check or draft's nonpayment."
9. Mower gave the check for $4,900 00 to Kirkman who defrauded him by failing to deliver
title to a vehicle as security for repayment and therefore, Mower did not receive anything of value
in exchange for the check.
10. The Court finds that Mower had no obligation under the criminal law to cover the
$4,900 00 check issued herein.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This Court has both personal jurisdiction over the defendant and subject matter jurisdiction
over this dispute.
2. The Court finds that the promise to deliver title by Kirkman who then defrauded Mower
is not sufficient to satisfy the statutory provision of UCA §76-6-505(2) of the State's claim that
Mower obtained something of value in return for payment of the $4,900.00.
3. The Court cannot find Mower possessed any criminal intent in this matter as Kirkman
engaged in deception of Mower and then obtained the financial benefit of the deception, thereby
causing the loss to his own credit union.
4. Even though Weber State Credit Union accepted Mower's check in good faith and
suffered a loss by paying out from Kirkman's account, it was Kirkman's deception to Mower and
subsequent deposit of the fraudulently obtained check in his account that caused of the loss to Weber
State Credit Union. The Court recognizes that Mower could possibly have stopped payment on the
check or taken other action to protect the credit union, but his failure to do so does not constitute
a criminal act contemplated by the statute as charged.
5. The Court believes its findings are consistent with the intent of the case of State v Green,
672 P 2d 400 (1990), even though the facts in Green and this case are distinguishable.
6. Mower should not be criminally liable under UCA §76-6-505(2) as he did not obtain or
intend to obtain something of value with a bad check.

ORDER
Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law:
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It is hereby Ordered that the criminal charge against Wayne A. Mower of Issuing a Bad
Check, a third degree felony, in violations of UCA §76-6-505(2) on June 12, 2002 is hereby
dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this f t

day of May, 2004.

ROGER S/DUTSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the following parties this^lf^"'
day of May, 2004:
BRENDA J. BEATON
Deputy Weber County Attorney
2380 Washington Blvd., 2nd Floor
Ogden, Utah 84401
JOHN T. CAINE
Attorney for Defendant
2491 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401

-jvaM. \Kjmd
DEPUTY COURT CLERK
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way he does business.
violated any —

The State -- the State —

he hasn't

any rules or business transactions by the way

he does business, if he does it in the way that the facts
describe and for the purposes of this hearing have been
accepted.
So, you know, to characterize that conduct again leads
me to believe that really what the State is telling you is he
wrote a check, Weber State's out the money, it's not their
fault, he needs to be prosecuted.
Well, that's not what the law says.

And, therefore, the

case should be dismissed.
THE COURT:

I've reviewed the Green case carefully

and other cases that have referred to Green.

And, of course,

most of the subsequent cases are stating that Green does not
apply because of differences in —

in the facts.

And I think Green is somewhat distinguished from this
case at hand in that the transaction involved was entirely
between the person charged with the crime and the United
Credit Union.

That is a distinguishing factor that isn't

involved here because we do have Weber State Credit Union
taking the loss in this case whereas in United the —

there

was no third party that was damaged.
But, frankly, I do not see that it makes a difference.
The purpose of obtaining —

he issued the check with the

purpose of obtaining something of value.

Laurie Shingle, RER
(801) 395-1055

The argument of the
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State is that he intended to get a title and repayment of a
loan.
But, frankly, that gets into the civil aspect of this
case.

And he did not, in fact, receive anything of value in

this transaction.

And I do not believe that the statute

should criminalize the conduct that occurred here against the
person that actually issued the check because, in fact, civil
remedies do exist for that.

And to make it a crime for

someone to innocently write a check and then be defrauded by
the recipient of that check, and then that person deposits
the check after committing the fraud and draws the money out
of it, I do not think distinguishes it sufficiently from
Green to say that the holding in Green should not apply.
Now, the sad thing about this is Weber State Credit
Union does suffer.

But as far as charging Mr. Mower, who had

no criminal intent in this case, to charge him with a crime I
think is beyond the scope of the statute.
And he quite clearly could be civilly liable for this,
even though it wasn!t his intent to defraud anyone.
put his check in the commercial stream.

He did

And it!s very much

like a husband and a wife getting divorced at that point then
if they had debts that were civil in nature, then they both
end up being civilly responsible for those debts.
But as far as criminally culpable, I can not see that
the statute is intended, in light of Green, to include

Laurie Shingle, RPR
(801) 395-1055
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Mr. Mower as one of those who should be criminally liable,
therefore.
And then the Court is granting the —

the motion of

defense here.
MR. CAINE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Now, Mr. Caine, you1re going to have to

prepare full findings —
MR. CAINE:

Findings?

All right.

THE COURT:

—

MR. CAINE:

If I can just ask here

THE COURT:

The sad thing about it is Weber State

and conclusions.
—

Credit Union suffers, but I do not believe that in the
criminal scheme of things that's covered by what is happening
here.

I feel badly for that.

But I think the remedy is

civil, under the circumstances, or criminal against Kirkland
I don!t know all of

(sic) who committed the fraud, perhaps.
his —

that he would have to say en it, but he did not give

the title and he did not give them anything of value as far
as I ' v e b e e n able to d e t e r m i n e here so
MR. C A I N E :

A l l right .

—

I will. do that and submit it

to Brenda.
D i a n e , (^ould I .right n o w :Indicate that I!ll need a tape

then of t h i s so t h a t I can —
THE C L E R K :

Yeah.

MR. C A I N E :

I will

I wrote down some of what the

Laurie Shingle, RPR
(801) 395-1055
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672P.2d400
672P.2d400
(Cite as: 672 P.2d 400)

Supreme Court of Utah.
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
John F. GREEN, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 18018.
Oct. 18, 1983.
Defendant was convicted before the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Peter F. Leary, J., of
issuing a bad check, and he appealed. The
Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that evidence was
insufficient to sustain conviction.
Reversed.
Hall, C.J., dissented and filed an opinion.
West Headnotes
False Pretenses €==>49(1)
170k49(l) Most Cited Cases
Evidence was insufficient to sustain conviction of
issuing a bad check. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-505.
*400 David K. Smith, Salt Lake City, for defendant
and appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Earl Dorms, Asst.
Arty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and
respondent.
HOWE, Justice:
This is an appeal by the defendant John F. Green
from a conviction by a jury of issuing a bad check
in violation of U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-505.
On February 24, 1981 the defendant and his wife,
LaRue Green, entered the branch office of United
Savings & Loan Company in West Jordan, Utah
shortly before closing time for the purpose of
opening a $10,000 savings account. UQ wrote a
check for that amount drawn on the Greens'

checking account at the West Jordan branch of the
Draper Bank & Trust Company. They were given
a $10,000 money market certificate which would
mature in six months. [FN1]
FN1. They were also given a gift
certificate but it was not introduced into
evidence. Hence we have no information
as to its nature or whether it had any value.
We note that some "gift certificates" only
provide a discount on the purchase of a
product which the donee may not wish to
purchase.
The following day, shortly after noon, the
defendant returned to United, and according to the
testimony of the only two employees who talked to
him he asked to "cancel or close" the certificate.
[FN2] Although United still had the check in its
office and had not yet deposited it in its account, it
refused his request unless he would pay a penalty of
six months' interest on the $10,000. Defendant
declined to agree to payment of the penalty and left
the premises to talk to his wife. He soon returned
with her and they requested to talk to United's
manager. The manager, too, denied their request
unless they would pay the penalty. She did,
however, offer to call the main office of United to
ascertain if the penalty could be waived. The
Greens thereupon left United without resolving the
matter. Shortly thereafter, employees of United
telephoned the Draper bank and were told that the
Greens' account on which the check was drawn had
been closed at about noon that day. United then
voided its copy of the certificate and a few days
later it presented the check to Draper Bank where it
was stamped "account closed" and returned unpaid
to United. When the defendant closed his bank
account it had a balance of only $6.28, and a check
for $10,000 would not have cleared at any time
subsequent to November 5, 1980. The defendant
testified that when he wrote the check he was
expecting payment due him of *401 a draft the next
day, which money he would use to cover the check.
He also claimed that he had sufficient money in
another account to cover the check but that later he
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changed his mind about purchasing the certificate
and did not make the necessary transfer of funds.
FN2. The dissent states that he requested
to "cash" the certificate. This was the
testimony of a teller who was leaving for
lunch who overheard part of the
defendant's conversation with another
teller who waited on him. However, the
latter and the manager both testified that he
wanted to "cancel or close" the certificate.
In any event, that difference in testimony
is inconsequential since the certificate
could not be cashed under United's policy.
Section 76-6-505(1) under which the defendant
was convicted provides:
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check for
the payment of money, for the purpose of
obtaining ... any money, property, or other thing
of value ... knowing it will not be paid by the
drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is
guilty of issuing a bad check.
In accordance, the trial court instructed the jury
that before they could convict the defendant they
would have to find, among other things, that he
"issued said check for the purpose of obtaining
money, property or other thing of value from United
Savings." The State completely failed to produce
any evidence which would satisfy this requirement
and the conviction of the defendant must be
reversed.
The undisputed evidence is that the defendant did
not write the check for the purpose of obtaining
from United any money, property or other thing of
value belonging to United. It was not intended by
either United or the defendant that United would
give him anything for his check. It was their
intention that the defendant open a savings account
in his own name with his own money. The check
was written for the purpose of transferring the funds
from the defendant's bank account to the new
account established at United. The money market
certificate was nothing more than a receipt for his
own funds (not United's) which he intended to
deposit but later changed his mind and did not
deposit. The certificate itself had no value until the
check creating the deposit cleared the bank upon
which it was drawn and a deposit in United came
Copr. © 2004 West. No (
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into being. Before that happened, the defendant
aborted the transfer of funds by closing the bank
account and by failing to deposit funds sufficient
therein to cover the $10,000 check. Thus no
deposit in United Savings was ever established and
the certificate remained a nullity.
Representatives of United Savings testified that the
certificate issued to the defendant was not
negotiable and could not be redeemed, cashed or
borrowed against until the check creating the
deposit had cleared the bank upon which it was
drawn and defendant's funds were in United's
possession, which normally took seven days. Thus
United did not part with anything of value which it
owned when it issued the certificate. It only failed
to acquire defendant's account and deposit in its
institution. Under these circumstances, it cannot be
said that the defendant issued his check for the
purpose of obtaining any money, property or thing
of value from United. An essential element of the
crime was missing.
There is no claim made by the State that the
defendant attempted to make any use of the
certificate. United did not incur any liability on the
certificate, including any liability to pay interest
thereon. Because of its policy of waiting until the
depositor's check cleared before honoring the
certificate, United was never at any risk. Our
statute simply does not make it a crime for a person
to write a bad check on one account and deposit it
to another account of his where the "deposit" is not
and could not be drawn against until the check has
cleared. This case involves nothing more than the
defendant writing himself a worthless check.
The conviction and sentence of the defendant is
reversed.
STEWART, OAKS and DURHAM, JJ., concur.
HALL, Chief Justice (dissenting):
I do not join the opinion of the Court because, in
my view, it invades the province of the jury, whose
prerogative it is to determine the facts. The Court
repeatedly asserts as fact that United "did not part"
with anything of value. However, this is but an
ipse dixit in light of the contrary conclusion reached
by the jury.
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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*402 The well-recognized rules of appellate review
require us to view the record in the light most
favorable to the jury verdict. When so viewed, the
record before us supports the following factual
synopsis.
On February 24, 1981, just prior to closing time of
6:00 p.m., defendant purchased from United
Savings & Loan Association (United) a $10,000
money market certificate to mature in six months.
He paid for the certificate with his personal check in
the amount of $10,000, drawn on the Draper Bank
& Trust (bank).
The following day, at 12:45 p.m., defendant
returned to United and sought not to "cancel or
close" the certificate, but to surrender the
certificate for cash This prompted United's teller
to advise that early withdrawal of the funds required
the assessment of an interest penalty. Defendant
expressed dissatisfaction with the penalty, stating
that he had a note which had come due and that he
was in need of all of the money to pay it off. [FN1]
Defendant then departed without resolving the
matter. He returned in a few minutes, at which
time he sought out United's manager and had a
similar discussion about the penalty to be applied in
the event of early withdrawal. At that time,
defendant advised the manager that he had expected
to receive some additional funds that morning
which had not materialized. Again defendant left
without resolving the matter and without requesting
the return of his check.
FN1. Had it been defendant's intention
only to "cancel or close" the certificate as
is surmised by the Court, surely there
would have been no discussion of a
penalty for early withdrawal.
United's teller and manager discussed the
variances in defendant's statements about his
financial affairs and then called the drawee bank,
whereupon they were informed that the account was
closed. They thereafter presented the check for
payment and it was returned, marked "account
closed." Defendant closed the account at noon on
February 25, after verifying to the bank that there
were no outstanding checks to be paid. At that
time, the account reflected a balance of only $6.28,
and a check for $10,000 would not have cleared any
Copr. © 2004 West. No (

time subsequent to November 5, 1980.
Defendant defended on the theory that it was his
intention to cover the check upon its presentation
for payment and that he simply wanted to cancel the
transaction because, overnight, he had changed his
mind about the purchase of the certificate, desiring
instead to invest the funds in diamonds.
In his opening statement, defense counsel
represented that the evidence would show that
defendant had the financial ability and that he in
fact intended to cover the check. This prompted a
discussion with the court outside the presence of the
jury, at which time defense counsel took the
position that defendant was entitled to present
evidence of his accounts with other financial
institutions in order to dispel any intent to defraud.
Counsel for the State lodged an objection to such
evidence on the grounds of relevancy and asserted
that the State had no burden to prove intent to
defraud, but only that defendant passed a check
"knowing it would not be paid," as expressly set
forth in the statute. [FN2] The trial judge agreed,
but withheld his ruling on the objection, stating, "If
the evidence comes in that way, I'll make a ruling
on it at that time ...."
FN2. U.C.A, 1953, § 76-6-505(1).
At trial, defendant testified that it was his intention
to cover the check with the funds he expected to
receive the following morning in payment of a debt,
and although the funds were not received, he had
other funds with which to cover the check. Later
on in his testimony, he again stated that although he
did not receive the expected funds, he had "another
way in which to cover the check." However, he
stopped short of testifying that it was ever his
intention to cover the check with funds from such
other sources.
Defense counsel called two witnesses for the
purpose of establishing that defendant had accounts
at Cottonwood Thrift & Loan and at FMA Thrift &
Loan. The State *403 renewed its objection on the
grounds of relevancy. The trial judge sustained the
objection on grounds of relevancy and foundation
and declined to permit the witnesses to testify.
On appeal, defendant urges three points of error:
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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(1) the court's refusal to permit the presentation of
evidence of defendant's accounts with other
financial institutions; (2) the court's refusal to give
requested jury instructions bearing upon the subject
of intent to defraud; and (3) insufficiency of the
evidence on the element of consideration or value.
The essential elements of the offense of issuing a
bad check as charged in the instant case are that:
(1) a check be issued for the payment of a sum in
excess of $1,000; (2) the check be issued for the
purpose of obtaining money, property, or other
thing of value; (3) the check be issued knowing that
it will not be paid; and (4) payment of the check is
refused by the drawee.
The trial court appropriately included each of the
foregoing elements of the offense in its instructions
to the jury. Defendant's contention that "intention
to defraud" is also an essential element of the
offense is not well-founded. While it is true that
intent to defraud was an essential element of the
offense under the former statute, [FN3] under the
currently revised statute, § 76-6-505, supra, the
gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a check
"knowing it will not be paid." [FN4] In any event,
the evidence offered by defendant was without
relevance to the issues and was offered without
foundation.
FN3. U.C.A, 1953, § 76-20-11, so
interpreted in State v. Coleman, 17 Utah
2d 166, 406 P.2d 308 (1965).

well within its prerogative to preclude the
presentation of such evidence on the grounds stated.
Although the other witnesses were not permitted to
testify as to defendant's other accounts, defendant
himself testified that even though he did not receive
the funds expected on the morning of February 25,
he nevertheless had "another way in which to cover
the check," and that he had "other funds with which
to cover the deposit or the check of $10,000."
Furthermore, notwithstanding the propriety of the
trial judge's rulings on the evidentiary and jury
instruction issues, in his closing argument to the
jury defense counsel was afforded wide latitude to
argue his theories of the case. He argued that
defendant obtained nothing of value in return for his
check because the money market certificate was not
freely negotiable. He argued that no money
changed hands, that defendant had no intention to
obtain money, and that he only wanted to cancel,
and not cash, the certificate because he had changed
his mind.
He further argued that defendant had no culpable
intent and had no intent to cheat or defraud United
of $10,000. but simply changed his mind because of
two things: (1) a desire to invest in diamonds, and
(2) the money he was expecting did not materialize.

FN4. State v. Delmotte, Utah, 665 P.2d
1314(1983).

As was its prerogative, the jury chose not to believe
defendant's explanation of his intentions. Rather,
as was also its prerogative, the jury chose to believe
the substantial, believable evidence that defendant
issued the check knowing that it would not be paid
on presentment.

As the evidence came in, the only affirmative
evidence offered of defendant's intention to cover
the check came from his own testimony that he
intended to cover it with the nebulous funds he
expected on the following morning. When these
funds were not forthcoming, he offered no evidence
of any further intention he had to cover the check.
Therefore, evidence of the fact that he may have
been able to demonstrate some other ability to cover
the check was clearly irrelevant. The evidence
offered would have shown nothing more than the
fact that defendant had other assets, not that he had
any intention to utilize them to prevent the check
from being dishonored. Thus, the trial court was

*404 In regard to defendant's remaining contention
of error, that he obtained nothing in return for his
bad check, the money market certificate was
"property, or other thing" of value within the
contemplation of § 76-6-505 if for no other reason
than its value as collateral for a loan, to which
defendant himself testified. However, in addition
thereto, the evidence was that the certificate was
negotiable for cash at United or any of its branches
and that in fact defendant attempted to cash it.
Also, defendant himself testified that in return for
his $10,000 check he immediately received not only
the money market certificate, but the gift certificates
United ga\e as incentive for a $10,000 deposit.
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The exact value of those certificates is not in
evidence, but it is unimportant. The degree of the
crime is determined by the amount of the bad check,
not the value obtained for it. [FN5]
FN5. U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-505(3).
I would affirm the jury
judgment of the trial court.

conviction and the

672P.2d400
END OF DOCUMENT

Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

1 J^L.

II

-

